"Our oil pipelines are equipped with automatic alarm systems—exactly 309,800 of them—covering nearly every possible vulnerability."
"These are simple temperature sensors linked to the main control room's computer. If a pipeline is damaged and starts leaking oil, the signal is immediately transmitted to the computer, allowing our monitoring staff to pinpoint the exact location of the issue."
Inside the control room, a technician was explaining to Martin with a tense expression.
Pointing to the computer screen, he said, "Mr. Meyers, do you see these green dots? Each one represents a temperature sensor. If a dot turns red, it indicates a problem—either the sensor itself is malfunctioning or the pipeline is leaking. In either case, repair teams and security personnel must be dispatched for an inspection."
"There is also another scenario," he continued. "If oil thieves don't cause significant damage but instead drill small holes to let the oil trickle into specially designed containers—"
"In such cases, the temperature sensor doesn't turn red but yellow, signaling a minor temperature fluctuation. This doesn't require an immediate response, but the nearest patrol team can be alerted to check the situation on their route..."
"If we have this system in place, why haven't we caught the oil thieves before?" Martin asked, puzzled.
Davis Scott glanced at Goodman Hall.
Hall looked around, ensuring they were surrounded only by their own people before saying, "I suspect we have informants within our security team. These thieves always manage to escape before our security forces arrive. It's too suspicious!"
"Oh? How many security personnel do we have, and what's their background?" Martin asked.
Hall replied, "About 1,500 in total. Six hundred are retired soldiers we hired from our home country, while the rest were recruited locally."
"Iraqis?" Martin frowned.
"Yes. Hiring locals reduces costs. We anticipated security risks, so we chose individuals with families living in Baghdad or nearby towns. Such people are usually more reliable, as they have families to support. But clearly—"
Hall shook his head in shame. "Clearly, some of them think differently. I apologize, Mr. Meyers. This is my responsibility."
Martin waved his hand dismissively. "Accountability can come later. First, we need to root out this traitor—or traitors. Have you devised a plan?"
"Yes!"
Hall was about to explain when Gordon entered the room and whispered something into Martin's ear.
Martin nodded.
Finding the traitor wouldn't be difficult—it was simply a matter of planting false information.
If necessary, Martin could even expend some magic to identify the culprit.
The real challenge was locating the Kurds' stronghold and wiping them out, along with their buyers.
These thieves didn't have the equipment to refine crude oil themselves, so there had to be a buyer financing their operations from the shadows.
Ilam was a twenty-year-old Kurdish youth—not particularly tall, but strong and agile.
His entire family had perished in gang wars, so he took up arms and joined the "Komala Gang" operating within Turkey.
The Komala Gang and the Turkish "Didika Gang" were sworn enemies.
In the world of organized crime, the Didika Gang and the Kurdish Komala Gang were relatively obscure compared to infamous global syndicates.
But their deeds and the chaos they caused were no less significant than any of the more well-known crime organizations.
During the first half of the 20th century, Turkey provided the raw materials for most of Europe's and the Americas' heroin production—at one point, accounting for as much as 60% of the total supply.
At the time, poppy cultivation was legal in Turkey, much like how Native Americans in the Americas used marijuana and coca leaves for medicinal purposes. Poppies were widely regarded as a universal remedy.
Turkish crime syndicates would refine raw opium into morphine, transport it to Corsica, and have it processed into heroin under the control of the Corsican mafia before shipping it to Europe and the Americas via the port of Marseille.
During this period, Turkish poppy-farming villages even formed cooperatives, and all poppy-derived products in the country were managed by a single individual known as "Babas"—Turkey's equivalent of a drug lord.
The Didika Gang served as Babas' paramilitary force, tasked with eliminating rival factions.
In the 1970s, under pressure from the United States, Turkey was forced to outlaw poppy cultivation. However, Babas didn't abandon this lucrative trade; instead, they began purchasing poppies from Pakistan and Afghanistan, refining them into opium before selling them to the Corsican mafia—or even producing heroin themselves.
Thanks to European immigration policies at the time, Turkey had a large diaspora scattered across various countries.
Babas exploited this network, distributing drugs to Turkish immigrants, who either supplied the Corsican mafia or ran their own distribution operations.
The profits from the drug trade were astronomical. But instead of hoarding the money, Babas used it to infiltrate Turkey's government, extending his influence over the military, national security, and other key sectors.
By the late 1970s, Turkey's Kurdish community—including the Kurdistan Workers' Party and other left-wing militants—set their sights on this "booming" business.
Coincidentally, a significant number of Kurdish refugees had also immigrated to Europe.
In order to fund their armed movements and terrorist organizations operating in the Middle East, they sought to claim a share of the drug trade, emulating Babas' business model.
Ethnic, religious, political, territorial, and historical conflicts had already fueled deep-seated animosity between Kurds and Turks.
With billions of dollars in illicit profits at stake, open warfare erupted between them.
In major European cities where both groups had significant populations—London in England, Berlin in Germany, Milan in Italy—waves of assassinations and shootouts destabilized local communities.
Unlike ordinary gang wars, there was no possibility of reconciliation between them. Even if one side claimed victory, the conflict wouldn't end. It had long transcended the realm of organized crime and evolved into an ethnic struggle.
It was during this period that the Komala Gang was established—a force dedicated to opposing the Didika Gang.
The battle between Kurds and Turks, which began in the 20th century, carried over into the 21st.
Eventually, the Turks—backed by government forces—emerged victorious. Many leaders of the Kurdistan Workers' Party were assassinated, captured, or turned traitor.
Kurdish influence within Turkey waned significantly.
The remnants of the Komala Gang, relentlessly hunted by the Didika Gang, had no choice but to flee into war-torn Iraq in a desperate bid for survival.